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Abstract
Affect Control Theory (ACT) is a powerful and general
sociological model of human affective interaction. ACT
provides an empirically derived mathematical model of
culturally shared sentiments as heuristic guides for human
decision making. BayesACT, a variant on classical ACT,
combines affective reasoning with cognitive (denotative or
logical) reasoning as is traditionally found in AI. BayesACT
allows for the creation of agents that are both emotionally
guided and goal-directed. In this work, we simulate BayesACT
agents in the Iterated Networked Prisoner’s Dilemma (INPD),
and we show four out of five known properties of human play
in INPD are replicated by these socio-affective agents. In
particular, we show how the observed human behaviours of
network structure invariance, anti-correlation of cooperation
and reward, and player type stratification are all clearly
emergent properties of the networked BayesACT agents.
We further show that decision hyteresis (Moody Conditional
Cooperation) is replicated by BayesACT agents in over 2/3
of the cases we have considered. In contrast, previously used
imitation-based agents are only able to replicate one of the five
properties. We discuss the implications of these findings in the
development of human-agent societies.
Keywords: Iterated Networked Prisoner’s Dilemma; PD;
computational social science; affect control theory; BayesACT
Introduction
A social dilemma may be defined as a “situation in which
individual rationality leads to collective irrationality” [25],
which is to say that agents acting out of purely rational
self-interest will decrease the total reward received by all
agents. Such situations are ubiquitous in modern society:
cutting off a fellow driver, jumping a queue, and accepting
under-the-table payment are minor, if not quite innocuous,
examples. Of course, not all such conflicts need be small.
For instance, we might view carbon emissions as a large
scale Tragedy of the Commons dilemma with potentially
disastrous consequences. Solutions to social dilemmas can
therefore have broad application, and have seen much study
by psychologists, sociologists, and more recently, computer
scientists.
As a means of abstraction, social dilemmas are frequently
cast as normal-form games. In the simplest case, these
games involve two players who must simultaneously choose
an action. Their choices are then used to assign each a payoff
from a pre-defined reward matrix. In general, the players’
matrices need not be identical (i.e. they may be rewarded
under different circumstances), but must be known by both
parties before actions are chosen.
Over decades of research, several canonical dilemmas/games
have emerged, each framing an otherwise sterile reward
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
Table 1: The general reward matrix and an example
reward matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. For all pairs, the
row player’s reward is shown first, and the column player’s
second.
matrix within a relatable story. Examples include Assurance,
Chicken, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Commons.
None, however, is better studied than the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
a game which has produced thousands of studies [25].
The reward structure of this game is summarized in Table
1, where cooperation and defection are represented by C
and D respectively, R is the reward for cooperation, S is the
sucker’s payoff for being duped, T is the temptation payoff,
and P is the punishment payoff. For a game to be considered
a true Prisoner’s Dilemma, the following inequality must be
obeyed [25].1
T > R > P > S (1)
As a direct result, for a single play of this game
(or any finite number of repeated games between two
players) defection is a dominant strategy and there is a
Nash equilibrium for pure defection [26]. In other words,
regardless of the choice the other makes, a player is rewarded
more for defection than cooperation. However, it has
repeatedly been shown that, in spite of this, human players
do not adhere to an all-defect strategy [6, 4, 11].
Humans are not strictly rational creatures. This allows us to
pursue a goal that could be viewed as non-traditional within
the scope of Artificial Intelligence: rather than attempting to
find the ”best” strategy that collects the highest reward, we
look for one that appears to best model the play of actual
people. Previous work in the same vein has analyzed human
play [11] by comparing human INPD experiments, and found
that humans exhibit five major properties. First, human play
is invariant to network structure. Second, global cooperation
rates decline over time, but remain non-zero. Third,
cooperation is anti-correlated with reward. Fourth, most
1Note that other permutations of this inequality may produce
other social dilemmas (eg. the Assurance Game is characterized by
R > T > P > S) or no dilemma at all (eg. R > S > T > P, where
cooperation dominates).
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humans exhibit “moody conditional cooperative” behaviour,
and fifth, human play is stratified into four major groups.
Our long term goal is to build automated agents that could
become authentic and accepted members of a mixed society
of biological and technological agents. In order to achieve
this goal, we must build agents that understand and respect
the emotional or affective reasoning that is a hallmark of
human intelligence [23, 3]. In this paper, we follow recent
work in sociological artificial intelligence [20, 35, 2] in
which agents are built upon the principles of affect control
theory (ACT). ACT arises from work on the sociology of
human interaction [15], and proposes that social perceptions,
behaviours, and emotions are guided by a psychological
need to maintain consistency in culturally shared affective
sentiments about social situations. This “affect control
principle” has been shown to be a powerful predictor of
human behaviour across a wide range of domains [27].
In this paper, we investigate whether automated agents
built on the principles of ACT can replicate the five properties
of human play in the INPD foud by Grujic´ et al. [11]. We
compare the ACT-based agents to agents playing standard
imitative strategies [41] across a range of different network
structures and payoff matrices. We find that while the
imitator agents only replicate one of the human properties,
the ACT-based agents clearly replicate four out of five, and
somewhat replicate a fourth. The only property that the
ACT-based agents did not reliably replicate was the decline
of cooperation rates over time. ACT-based agents remained
much more cooperative in the long-term than humans, a
property that was also observed in the human studies reported
in [22].
To achieve our long-term goal of acceptable technological
agents in human society, we wish to produce an agent that
can act as a human analogue in the context of games or
game-like situations, and we would like it to determine its
actions in a way that is as consistent with human cognition as
is possible. Meeting this condition grants predictive power,
as many important activities may be cast as games, (e.g.
auctions and elections). Additionally, it has been shown
(e.g. by Kiesler et al. [24]) that humans behave differently
when they know that they are playing against a machine.
In many applications, this is undesirable. An agent that is
better at playing like humans is therefore better at playing
with humans.
In this paper, we study one particular class of social
dilemmas that are known to have many analogies in human
society. Although the game-like structures we are studying
are limiting in that they do not directly involve humans in
real-life situations, the basis of our work in well-established,
empirically derived sociological models of human behaviour
helps substantiate the generalisability of our results.
Related Work
Affect Control Theory and BayesACT
ACT, as first formalized by David Heise [14], begins from
the well-established fact that every concept carries with it
a culturally shared emotional sentiment [30]. That is to
say, two individuals within a close social group will tend to
make similar emotional evaluations of a given thing (car, dog,
hospital, etc.), action (hug, kick, kill, etc.), or person (banker,
child, senior, etc.).2 Further, ACT posits that this identity can
be measured with three numerical values ∈ [−4.3,4.3][14]: 3
• Evaluation: good/nice vs. bad/awful
• Potency/Power: strong/big/powerful vs. weak/little/po-
werless
• Activity: exciting/active/fast/loud vs. calm/passive/sl-
ow/quiet
The EPA space is hypothesized to be a universal organizing
principle of human socio-emotional experience, based
on the discovery that these dimensions structure the
semantic relations of linguistic concepts across languages and
cultures [31]. They also emerged from statistical analyses of
the co-occurrence of a large variety of physiological, facial,
gestural, and cognitive features of emotional experience [7],
and relate to the universal dimensionality of personality, and
social cognition [34].
Combined, Evaluation, Potency, and Activity form the
EPA triple, which encapsulates a sentiment in ACT.
Sociologists have gathered such values for many common
words by conducting large, cross-cultural studies [16, 32].
As such, they represent the fundamental (or out-of-context)
sentiments held by the particular group surveyed. Affect
control theorists have compiled lexicons of a few thousand
words along with average EPA ratings obtained from survey
participants who are knowledgeable about their culture [16].
For example, most English speakers agree that professors
are about as nice as students (E), more powerful (P) and
less active (A). The corresponding EPAs (called identity
sentiments or identities when referring to social roles of
people) are [1.7,1.8,0.5] for professor and [1.8,0.7,1.2] for
student.4
An individual’s feelings about an entity (person/thing/ac-
tion) may change temporarily when that entity is observed
in some context [14]. Consider for example a professor
(actor) who yells (behaviour) at a student (object). Most
would agree that this professor appears considerably less
nice (E), a bit less potent (P), and certainly more active
(A) than the cultural average of a professor. To formalize
this idea, ACT defines transient sentiments (called transient
impressions) to be EPA values that have been altered by
2Note that there is no hard cut-off for what constitutes a “close
social group”. In practice, a country may constitute such a group, as
has been the case for the USA [8].
3The scale of 4.3 is a historical convention.
4 All EPA labels and values in this paper are taken from the
Indiana 2002-2004 ACT lexicon [16] unless otherwise noted.
context. In this case, context entails an Actor-Behaviour-
Object (A-B-O) interaction, in which an Actor (A) performs
a Behaviour (B) on an Object (O). The transient shifts in
affective meaning caused by specific events are described
using models of the form τ = MG (f), τ is the transient
impression of the A-B-O triple (a nine-dimensional vector),
f is the fundamental sentiment (also a 9D vector), M is a
globally defined matrix of statistically estimated prediction
coefficients from empirical impression-formation studies
and G is a vector of polynomial features in f that are
hand-crafted to reflect important relationships between the
various sentiments. The squared Euclidean distance between
fundamental and transient sentiments increases with the
unexpectedness of the interaction, and is called the deflection.
It is from this quantity that ACT draws its predictive power
as a model of human behaviour. It states that people naturally
act in a way that minimizes the deflection they create [14].
That is, one’s default action is that which aligns best with
society’s expectations. Given an Actor and an Object, it is
therefore possible to predict a Behaviour by choosing for it
an EPA profile that minimizes the deflection. Certainly, and
agent may choose to act in a different way, but then must
incur the penalties of deflection. This may entail feelings
of being disingenuous to one’s true self (discomfort, guilt,
etc.), as well as receiving a re-identification in the eyes of
any observers or interactants. Such re-identifications can
significantly alter the subsequent course of the interaction.
ACT has been shown to be highly accurate in explaining
verbal behaviours of mock leaders in a computer-simulated
business [37], non-verbal displays in dyadic interactions [36],
and group dynamics [17], among others [27]. The case of
group dynamics is of particular interest for our work, as it
presents a sophisticated model of interactant selection based
on perceived deflections and feelings of inauthenticity [17].
This ACT-based model was applied to simulated jury
deliberation data in [17], and found to replicate important
properties of the human data. As such, it could form a future
extension of the work we present here.
BayesACT is a recently proposed generalisation of ACT,
adding three new elements [19]. First, sentiments are
viewed as probability distributions over latent variables rather
than points in the EPA space, allowing for multimodal,
uncertain and dynamic sentiments to be modeled and
learned. One frequently encounters situations where multiple
identities may be mixed, and multiple sentiments may
occur simultaneously [39]. Second, affective interactions
are augmented with denotative state (e.g. the usual state
space considered in typical AI applications). Third, an
explicit reward function allows for goals that go beyond
simple deflection minimization. The BayesACT model is
formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP), and a Monte-Carlo tree search method based on
the POMCP algorithm [38] is used to generate a policy of
action. In this method, nodes in a decision tree are expanded
with probability inversely proportional to the deflection
their respective action creates. That is to say, a desire to
minimize the deflection guides the direction in which the tree
expands, but the actual action taken is ultimately decided by
maximization of the reward received. This is accomplished
by repeated sampling of the state space distribution for as
much time as is allowed, where a longer running time results
in a more densely filled tree, and therefore a more ”scheming”
agent. We refer the reader to the complete description of the
model in [20, 35].
When applied to the prisoner’s dilemma game, we use
the method described by Asghar and Hoey [2], in which
the two identities (the players in the game) are set to a be
probabilistic random mixture of friend (EPA:{2.8,1.9,1.4})
and scrooge (EPA:{ 2.2, 0.2, 0.5}). Thus, if an agent
thought of himself as a friend and knew the other agent
to be a friend, the deflection minimizing action would
likely be something good (high E), which is closer
(affectively) to the cooperation action (e.g. collaborate with
(EPA:{1.44,1.11,0.61})), rather than the defection action
(e.g. abandon (EPA:{ 2.3, 0.5, 0.8})). Using this method,
we can compute that a friend would still collaborate with a
scrooge (in an attempt to reform the scrooge), while a scrooge
would abandon a friend (look away from in shame), and two
scrooges would defect.
Another way of assigning identities for agents is to
measure human identity sentiments while playing the PD
game with other humans. For this, we used the data from the
work of Jung et al. [22], in which the affective sentiments
of PD game players were measured via surveys. These
results provide actual initial distributions rather than simple
points in EPA space (as in the friend/scrooge case) for
the agent’s self-identity and its perception of its opponent’s
identity. Additionally, sentiments were similarly collected
for each of the two actions, cooperate and defect. Though
BayesACT does not currently support distributions for these,
their averages provide points in EPA space that are tuned
specifically for the purposes of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Further discussion of these values may be found in the
“Experimental Parameters” section.
Our work differs from that in Asghar and Hoey [2],
as we are interested in the networked version of the
game, and (importantly), we conduct an explicit quantitative
comparison between the results of BayesACT and those of
real human study participants. Additionally, as BayesACT
is designed to keep a single EPA distribution for its self-
identity and another such distribution for its opponent, it is
not immediately equipped to handle multiple opponents (and
hence, a networked setting). We have therefore modelled
this multiple-opponent case as a single game against an
aggregate opponent, whose actions have an EPA equal to
the average EPA of those from all individual opponents.
This approach allows each BayesACT agent to have a
consistent self-sentiment and permits all interactions to occur
simultaneously.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Study of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma dates back to
1952, with the experiments of Merrill Flood and Melvin
Dresher [6]. In this work and others that followed [1, 4],
it is observed that human participants do not play the game
rationally (in the game theoretic sense). This is easiest to see
in the single-shot version of the game, which has defection as
a dominant strategy, yet produces high rates of cooperation
from human players [4].
It can also be shown that pure defection is a dominant
strategy for any version of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
for which the number of rounds is known by the players [26].
However, studies have shown that this is not the way that
humans behave [1, 4, 6]. Clearly, there are more factors at
play than reward maximization.
Explanations for this cooperative behaviour have been
linked to the phenomenon of altruism in nature [29], which
may give an evolutionary benefit through factors like kinship,
direct reciprocity, or indirect reciprocity via reputation.
Trivers [40] argues that such altruism would almost certainly
have been an advantageous trait for early groups of humans
to have, citing cases that come at a small cost to the giver,
but result in a large benefit for the receiver. Examples include
sharing food and tools, helping the wounded, sick, or very
young, and sharing knowledge. Further, small, stable groups
would have provided ample opportunity for acts of altruism
to be applied to kin, or to be reciprocated by the receiver
in the future. As a means of encouraging such acts, Trivers
proposes the development (or at least co-option) of emotion.
Sympathy is an impetus to help those in need. Gratitude
promotes returning the favour. Guilt dissuades from cheating
others in the group.
This is all to say that a person playing the Prisoner’s
Dilemma might choose not to defect out of guilt, which,
to that person, is simply an immediate emotional response.
However, that guilt exists as a means of promoting altruism
through a long evolutionary process. By application of ACT,
we can now predict when such emotional intervention will
occur.
Networked Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
When generalizing the Prisoner’s Dilemma to include more
than two players (ie. the N-Person [Iterated] Prisoner’s
Dilemma), we must choose how to expand the reward matrix
to accommodate the additional agents. In this work, we
employ the Broadcast model, in which an agent chooses
to either cooperate or defect, and this choice is applied to
all partners (neighbours) according to a matrix in the form
described by Table 1. This framework is desirable because
it provides an opportunity to compare our results to those of
studies conducted with human participants, usually (but not
always) arranged on a grid [10, 12, 33].
Grujic´ et al. [11] examine several such studies and make
five observations regarding general human player behaviour:
1. Network Invariance - Once the number of neighbours
has exceeded two, the average degree and structure of the
network cease to significantly affect cooperation rates.
2. Declining Cooperation Over Time - The global
cooperation rate begins high, but asymptotically declines
to a near constant, but non-zero value.
3. Anti-Correlation of Earnings and Cooperation - On
average, cooperation yields a lower reward than defection.
This comes as a result of defectors performing better in a
mixed environment.
4. Moody Conditional Cooperation (MCC) - The largest
fraction of players exhibit behaviour consistent with
Moody Conditional Cooperation, a strategy in which
the probability of an agent cooperating increases with
the number of cooperating neighbours, but also has a
hysteresis. That is, an agent who cooperated last turn
is more likely to cooperate again than one who defected
last turn, assuming the two have the same number of
cooperating neighbours.
5. Player Type Stratification - The remaining players are
stratified into the other four groups identified by Grujic´ et
al. [10] (Pure Cooperators, Mostly Cooperators, Mostly
Defectors, and Pure Defectors).
Our goal is to build automated strategies to replicate these
findings about human play. However, simple deterministic
agents, like tit-for-tat (which copies its partner’s last move),
while highly effective in non-networked PD games, turn out
to be uninteresting in the networked setting. Plain tit-for-tat,
in particular, produces a network of either full cooperation
or full defection in just a few iterations. However, more
complex imitation-based models replicate at least the MCC
property. For example, in the model we compare against in
this paper [41], every simulated agent plays by the following
strategy:
• With probability q, imitate the action of a randomly
chosen neighbour.
• With probability (1− q), perform a strategic imitation.
(Several different methods were tried, but the main one
presented in [41] is Unconditional Imitation, in which the
single best scoring neighbour, including self, is imitated.)
Description of the Experiment
For each test, 169 bots of one type (ie. BayesACT or
imitation), where 169 was chosen to correspond with a 13
by 13 grid, were arranged on a static network to play the
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with their neighbours. These
games each lasted for 60 individual rounds (or iterations),
a number comparable to those of the largest human studies
[11]. For each setting of our test parameters (to be described
shortly), 20 independent games were played, resulting in
approximately 3000 total simulations 5.
Each round, agents chose between cooperation and
defection and relayed that choice to each of their partners
5(17 agents)*(9 matrix/network combinations)*(20 simulations
each) = 3060 simulations
(where partners are defined to be neighbours on one of the
networks described below), thus adhering to the Broadcast
model. Scores were then determined by summing the rewards
earned in each of the resulting one-on-one games. Partners
were selected on the basis of static network connections
determined before starting the game.
Experimental Parameters
Network Types We selected two classes of networks on the
basis of their use in either human studies [11] or the work of
Vilone et al. [41] on imitation-based agents:
• Grid - Agents are arranged on a square grid and
interact with their nearest neighbours. These neighbours
may belong to either a Moore (four neighbours, cardinal
directions only) or von Neumann (eight neighbours,
diagonals included) neighbourhood.
• Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) - Given a desired average node degree,
all networks with that property are equally likely to be
chosen. ie. Edges are chosen randomly with uniform
probability until some threshold is reached.
Given that these network types (which, of course, are not
the only possible valid networks) can be varied in infinite
ways (for instance, by density), we had a free choice over
which would actually be incorporated into this experiment.
The selections we made are as follows:
1. a grid layout with a Moore neighbourhood (Grid),
2. an ER network with average degree 5.14 (ER5),
3. an ER network with average degree 8.48 (ER8).
where the particular values of 5.14 and 8.48 were chosen
to mirror those employed by Vilone et al. [41] It is
additionally convenient that our first and third networks had
similar density, differing primarily in the regularity of their
connections.
Reward Matrices Despite (or perhaps because of) the
enormous number of Prisoner’s Dilemma studies, there has
been little agreement on reward values outside the basic
inequality given by Equation 1. They therefore present
another free choice. In this experiment, we use the matrices
given by Table 2. The first matrix (M1) satisfies the Prisoner’s
Dilemma inequality with the smallest possible non-negative
integers, the second (M2) is one setting employed by
Vilone et al. [41], and the third (M3) is the one used by
Asghar and Hoey [2]. To a large extent, it is not any
particular set of matrix values that is important, but rather,
the difference between them. In particular, defection is far
more beneficial on M1 than on M3, which creates two very
different situations for bots to handle. In fact, Vilone et
al. [41] tested a continuum of matrices like M2 by varying
T (The ‘temptation’ to defect, as in Table 1). Our M2
uses a value of T that saw a large variation in behaviour
depending on the value of their randomization parameter, q.
M2 does not adhere to the strict inequality of Equation 1, but
nevertheless preserves the central difficulty of the Prisoner’s
M1
C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
M2
C D
C 1,1 0,1.4
D 1.4,0 0,0
M3
C D
C 10,10 0,11
D 11,0 1,1
Table 2: Reward matrices chosen for our experiments.
Dilemma (namely, that a rational agent defects while the
global optimum is for cooperation).
Other Parameters Additionally, each of the two bots
tested had their own unique parameters. In the case of
BayesACT, we chose to vary the initial EPA distribution
between the original set as presented by Hoey et al. [19]
and one gleaned from a human study by Jung et al.
[22]. In the former, the cooperate and defect actions
were assigned the EPAs of “flatter” (EPA:{2.1,1.5,0.8}) and
“abandon” (EPA:{−2.3,−0.5,−0.8}) respectively, while in
the latter, they were found to be (EPA:{1.4,0.1,0.2}) and
(EPA:{−0.7,0.9,0.7}) by surveying human participants. We
also applied several different computation time limits (0, 1,
and 10 seconds) to BayesACT’s POMCP search. When a
particular setting of these parameters must be identified, we
use the shorthand BACT[X][Y], where X is one of D or S
(denoting default or study EPA settings) and Y is one of 0, 1,
or 10 (denoting the POMCP timeout).
For the imitation-based bots, we varied q, the probability
of randomly selecting any neighbour instead of the highest
scorer, from 0% to 100% in 10% intervals. We identify this
via the shorthand IM[X], where X ∈ [0,100] is the value of q.
Results
We now examine the results of these experiments with respect
to the five observations of Grujic´ et al. [11]. For nominal
variables, we have applied the G-test to show independence
(or lack thereof) of two distributions. The G-test is the
likelihood ratio G = 2∑i Oilog(Oi/Ei), where Oi is the
observed count and Ei is the expected count [28]. This can be
converted to a p-value, for which we consider a value of 0.05
to constitute strong evidence that the distributions in question
are different. For continuous variables, we used ANOVA,
which produces a similar p-value.
Network Invariance
For all parameter settings of the BayesACT agents, we
do not find evidence that network structure impacts agent
behaviour. This is demonstrated by the consistently high
p-values obtained when performing a G-test of cooperation
rate per round across the 3 network types for a particular
reward matrix, indicating that the three distributions are not
statistically discernible. In particular, for BACTD agents,
96.1% of rounds (each corresponding to one table row) have
p > 0.05, while for BACTS agents, this is true of 90.7% of
rows, where 100% corresponds to 540 total table rows (60
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 32.81 33.05 33.46 0.33 0.85
R1 33.67 33.76 33.64 0.01 0.99
R2 31.12 32.51 32.87 2.64 0.27
R3 30.50 30.00 31.54 1.95 0.38
R4 30.30 30.15 30.24 0.02 0.99
... ... ... ... ... ...
R57 29.23 28.17 28.79 0.95 0.62
R58 27.43 27.31 28.14 0.68 0.71
R59 28.22 28.02 28.99 0.88 0.64
Table 3: Comparing cooperation rates by round across our
three network types for a BayesACT agent using the default
EPA distribution, a timeout of 1 second, and the first of our
three reward matrices (M1). Rows are shaded for p-values
> 0.05, indicating that the distributions for the three network
type are not statistically discernible.
rounds/game X 3 reward matrices X 3 BayesACT parameter
settings). As an example, Table 3 gives these data for one
BayesACT setting, and for matrix M1. Notice that the
cooperation rates for each of the various networks within a
row are within just a few percent of each other. A G-test
shows that these small differences are, in fact, not statistically
significant, indicating network invariance.
Imitation-based agents, on the other hand, do not seem
to consistently exhibit this invariance. For IM agents, only
5.6% of rounds have p > 0.05, where 100% corresponds to
1980 total table rows (60 rounds/game X 3 reward matrices
X 11 imitator parameter settings). We find that there
is a strong tendency for these agents to gradually move
towards full defection, but they frequently do so at different
rates, depending on the network (with the cooperation rate
of the comparatively low density ER5 network frequently
decaying the slowest 6). Further, when full defection has
been reached for one network, any deviation in the others
becomes statistically significant. This results in low G-
test p-values when observing cooperation rates on a per-
round basis, indicating that behaviour is indeed affected by
network structure. An example of this behaviour is given by
Table 4, where we see large differences in cooperation rates
within a row, particularly between ER5 and the two other
networks. Very low G-test p-values (p << 0.05) indicate that
these differences are statistically significant and that network
invariance is therefore not observed.
Cooperation Rate Over Time
In human studies, the global cooperation rate has been
observed to drop from 55%-70% to less than 20%-40%
after around 20 rounds of play, after which it remains
6In fact, if we consider only the Grid and ER8 networks, which
have very similar average degree, the number of rows with p > 0.05
increases significantly to 27.7%, indicating that density may have a
large effect on the behaviour of imitator agents
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.36 49.67 48.91 4.27 0.12
R1 25.15 30.83 26.09 31.18 < 0.001
R2 12.69 17.10 12.96 33.01 < 0.001
R3 6.27 8.82 5.98 24.46 < 0.001
R4 2.75 4.76 3.11 22.00 < 0.001
... ... ... ... ... ...
R57 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R58 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R59 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
Table 4: Comparing cooperation rates by round across our
three network types for an imitation agent using q = 0.5 and
the first of our three reward matrices (M1). Rows are shaded
for p-values > 0.05, indicating that the distributions for the
three network type are not statistically discernible.
approximately constant [11]. We do not in general observe
this behaviour in our BayesACT agents. While some
settings of BayesACT do demonstrate a reduction in global
cooperation rate over time (ie. round number), this difference
is typically less than 5%
The imitation-based agents, on the other hand, tended to
display one of two extreme behaviours: either the cooperation
rate decayed to zero, or it ballooned to some constant greater
that its starting value. In some cases, individual simulations
of the same parameter settings were split between these final
states, though a descent into full defection was generally the
more common of two. Such behaviour is also decidedly non-
human.
Figure 1 shows an example of the cooperation rate over
time for human players (taken from [9]) and for two
simulations each of imitation-based and BayesACT agents.
The slow decline but stabilisation of human players can be
seen, while the IM simulations were selected to demonstrate
the two behaviours described above (i.e. a quick descent
into full defection or a ballooning cooperation rate). On
the other hand, BayesAct simulations produce more stable
cooperation rates, some of which are relatively close to those
of humans (after stabilization), and some of which are not
(as our two selected simulations demonstrate). In any case,
we do not generalize the initial rapid drop in cooperation rate
characteristic of human players.
Distributions over cooperation rates after 1,10,30 and 60
rounds are shown in Figure 2. Again, we see the imitation
agents rapidly have almost all converged to all defect, while
BayesACT agents remain more stable in the middle (just less
than 50% cooperation.
Anti-Correlation of Earnings and Cooperation
Before calculating correlation coefficients, it is worth
examining the relative scores of cooperators and defectors,
which ought to be higher for the defectors. Across all
parameter settings, BayesACT agents score lower when
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Figure 1: Cooperation rates by round for human
players [9] (which had matrix parameters T=10, R=7,
P=0, S=0, and used a grid layout with a von Neumann
neighbourhood) [9], and selected simulations for BayesACT
(bottom: BACTS1/M1/ER5, top: BACTS0/M1/Grid) and
imitator (bottom: IM50/M2/Grid, top: IM100/M3/Grid)
agents.
cooperating than when defecting (i.e. test passed for 100% of
both BACTD and BACTS agents). While the imitator agents
do display this property for Matrix 1 (for 100% of settings),
they do not generally do so for Matrices 2 and 3 (6.7% and
0% of settings, where the only successful agents were the
purely random imitators, IM100). It is important to note that
reward matrix values are parameters of the simulation, not of
the agents. That is to say, a successful agent must have at
least some parameter setting that can cope with any possible
reward matrix. A failure of the imitator agents for M3 (and
M2 as well, if we exclude IM100) indicates a failure overall.
Table 5 gives an example of these results, where we see
that BayesACT simulations produce higher average scores for
defectors (the desired result), while IM simulations show just
the opposite. In all cases, there was a statistically significant
difference between the scores of cooperators and defectors,
as calculated by ANOVA.
We see similar results when calculating the Pearson
Correlation between the cooperation rates of individual
agents and their scores (normalized by the average score of
all agents in their simulation). To consider Requirement 3
satisfied, we must see a negative correlation coefficient that
is statistically significant (p < 0.05). By this metric, we
find that 100% of BACTD settings and 74.1% of BACTS
settings (100% for M1, 88.9% for M2, 33.3% for M3)
display the desired anti-correlation. Given that even the
best BACTS settings (BACTS0 or BACTS10) only achieved
77.8% requirement satisfaction, they may be considered less
successful than their BACTD counterparts. However, this
difference is small compared to the imitator agents, which
displayed cooperation-score anti-correlation in only 30.3% of
settings (81.8% for M1, 9.1% for M2, 0% for M3), with the
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Figure 2: Histograms of the number of simulations
at various cooperation rates for imitator agents (left) and
BayesACT agents (right) at rounds 0, 10, 30, and 60 (top
to bottom). BayesACT agents tend to remain fairly constant
in their behaviour, while imitator agents have a strong
tendency towards full defection (and to a lesser extent, full
cooperation).
best setting, IM10, succeeding in 44.4% of matrix/network
combinations. By both of our metrics, then, BayesACT
satisfies Requirement 3 more adequately than the imitator
bots.
Table 6 gives an example of these results, where we see
that all BACTD agents achieve the desired negative Pearson
coefficient with a statistically significant p-value, which is not
the case for either the BACTS or IM agents.
Moody Conditional Cooperation
Moody Conditional Cooperation has two requirements:
hysteresis (i.e. an agent must be more likely to cooperate
if it cooperated on the last turn) and conditionality (i.e. an
agent must be more likely to cooperate if its neighbours were
predominantly cooperators on the last turn) [10]. Example
settings for each of these are given by Table 7 and Table
8 respectively. In the former, we expect to see higher
cooperation rates after a previous cooperation than after a
defection (with p < 0.05), which is the case for all BACTD
and IM agents, but not for our BACTS agents. In the latter,
we expect higher cooperation rates when surrounded by a
majority of cooperators rather than defectors (with p < 0.05),
which is the case for some BACTD, some BACTS, and all IM
agents.
Though the various BayesACT agents had performed
fairly similarly until this point, we see here that those
using the default set of initial EPA values seem to display
a strong hysteresis (in 100% of test settings), while
those using the study set do not (only 4% of all test
settings). Additionally, even the best of the BACTS agents,
BACTS0, showed a hysteresis in only 11% of network/matrix
combinations. We believe that this is most likely a result
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 25.72 30.54 4.01×103 < 0.001
BACTD1 23.67 28.64 4.78×103 < 0.001
BACTD10 19.61 24.97 6.27×103 < 0.001
BACTS0 35.69 40.82 3.09×103 < 0.001
BACTS1 32.52 37.48 3.40×103 < 0.001
BACTS10 25.33 30.20 4.35×103 < 0.001
IM0 45.19 22.51 4.05×104 < 0.001
IM10 47.41 21.81 4.20×104 < 0.001
IM20 46.11 19.14 6.14×104 < 0.001
IM30 42.35 21.69 4.28×104 < 0.001
IM40 35.92 14.03 6.59×104 < 0.001
IM50 26.89 11.96 3.49×104 < 0.001
IM60 19.80 8.51 2.08×104 < 0.001
IM70 19.58 8.87 1.87×104 < 0.001
IM80 20.41 9.06 2.06×104 < 0.001
IM90 22.97 12.69 1.58×104 < 0.001
IM100 25.12 22.57 9.57×102 < 0.001
Table 5: Comparing scores earned by cooperators and
defectors among different agent types. Shaded rows indicate
that the average score for defection is higher than that of
cooperation, as per Requirement 3, and that the difference is
statistically significant (p < 0.05). This table presents results
for network ER5 and Reward M3.
of the larger difference between the EPAs of the cooperate
and defect actions in the default set [(EPA:{2.1,1.5,0.8})
and (EPA:{−2.3,−0.5,−0.8}) vs (EPA:{1.4,0.1,0.2}) and
(EPA:{−0.7,0.9,0.70})] resulting in higher deflections and
hence more severe reactions.
Looking at the best settings reveals that BACTD0 displays
conditionality in 44% of network/matrix combinations, while
BACTS1 does so in 67% of them. Viewed in aggregate
across all reward matrices and all network structures, 22%
of BACTD and 44% of BACTS agents exhibit statistically
significant conditionality. We therefore make only a modest
claim of conditional cooperation that we return to in the
discussion.
All imitator agents, on the other hand, have both strong
hysteresis and conditionality (i.e. 100% of settings). Given
the tendency of these systems to develop towards either high
cooperation or total defection, this is not surprising.
Player Type Stratification
According to Grujic´ et al. [10], human players can be broadly
classified as belonging to one of 5 groups: those who only
cooperate, those who mostly cooperate (at least two times
in three), moody conditional cooperators, those who mostly
defect (at least two times in three), and those who only defect.
These groups tend to be unevenly populated, with the most in
the middle group, fewer in either of the “mostly” groups, and
very few in either of the “pure” groups. Thus, we can define
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.79 28.13 −0.10 < 0.001
BACTD1 45.93 26.36 −0.12 < 0.001
BACTD10 38.60 22.90 −0.16 < 0.001
BACTS0 69.49 37.26 −0.02 0.212
BACTS1 63.14 34.35 0.00 0.949
BACTS10 48.99 27.81 0.00 0.857
IM0 74.06 39.30 0.16 < 0.001
IM10 80.49 42.41 0.07 < 0.001
IM20 71.99 38.56 0.09 < 0.001
IM30 64.49 35.01 0.08 < 0.001
IM40 35.96 21.90 0.10 < 0.001
IM50 21.66 15.19 0.14 < 0.001
IM60 9.89 9.63 0.04 0.021
IM70 10.74 10.02 0.05 0.007
IM80 11.49 10.37 0.05 0.004
IM90 21.11 14.86 0.05 0.008
IM100 39.95 23.59 0.10 < 0.001
Table 6: Comparing cooperation rates with scores
earned. Shaded rows indicate that the correlation between
cooperation rate and score is negative and statistically
significant (p < 0.05). This table presents results for network
ER5/Reward M3.
a stratification condition as shown in Equation 2.
(Mixed% >MostlyD% >PureD% >0)
∧(Mixed% >MostlyC% >PureC% >0) (2)
For human systems that settle on a comparatively high level
of cooperation, it makes sense to consider MCC as the middle
group. However, given the imitator agents tendency towards
full defection, MCC behaviour is not limited to the middle
third of cooperation rates. Hence, we have simply called the
middle group “Mixed”, and dealt with MCC on its own. For
one experimental setting, this data is given by Table 9, where
we have shaded rows that meet the stratification condition.
Averaged across all reward matrices and all network types,
we see see 100% satisfaction of Equation 2 from BACTD0.
There is therefore at least one setting of BayesACT that
behaves in a human-like fashion according to Requirement
5 of Grujic´ et al. [10]. BACTS remains unstratified for
all parameter settings, while 3% of IM agents show strong
stratification (i.e. adhere to Equation 2).
On the other hand, the best IM bot, IM100, only satisfies
Equation 2 in 33% of network/matrix combinations. If
IM100 is discounted (because p = 100 corresponds to never
actually using strategic imitation, but rather always imitating
a neighbour at random), then there are no imitator bots that
meet the stratification requirement in any test setting.
Discussion and Future Work
We have shown how agents based on Affect Control
Theory (BayesACT agents) clearly replicate four of the
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.51 31.26 2.69×104 < 0.001
BACTD1 64.96 29.68 2.53×104 < 0.001
BACTD10 60.37 24.74 2.54×104 < 0.001
BACTS0 69.44 69.56 0.31 0.58
BACTS1 62.89 63.42 5.67 0.017
BACTS10 48.07 49.61 47.28 < 0.001
IM0 95.93 13.48 1.35×105 < 0.001
IM10 95.33 22.77 9.12×104 < 0.001
IM20 92.79 20.62 1.04×105 < 0.001
IM30 86.23 26.15 7.42×104 < 0.001
IM40 73.77 14.30 7.26×104 < 0.001
IM50 56.78 11.19 3.70×104 < 0.001
IM60 43.26 5.41 1.97×104 < 0.001
IM70 40.84 6.33 1.72×104 < 0.001
IM80 40.85 6.88 1.72×104 < 0.001
IM90 44.94 14.02 1.72×104 < 0.001
IM100 48.76 33.81 4.45×103 < 0.001
Table 7: A comparison of cooperation rates after
either cooperating or defecting on the last turn. Shaded
rows indicate that cooperation is higher after previously
cooperating than it is after previously defecting (i.e.
hysteresis is observed) and that the difference is statistically
significant (p < 0.05). This table presents results for network
ER5 and Reward M3.
five properties of human play in the iterated networked
prisoner’s dilemma: network invariance, cooperation-score
anti-correlation, and stratification. We have further shown
that these BayesACT agents replicate a fourth property
(moody conditional cooperation) in 2/3 of the cases we
have considered. Agents based on the more commonly used
homophilic principle of imitation only replicate the moody
conditional cooperation property, which they are specifically
designed to reproduce [41].
The BayesACT agents considered in this paper are the
simplest type, and were implemented with only the default
base parameter settings. For example, a BayesACT agent
keeps an EPA distribution for the perception of its opponent.
As one action must be chosen to be applied to all partners, we
modeled the complete set of them as one general “opponent”.
Both this distribution and the one for self are allowed to
change as observations are received. For instance, after its
partner defects, a BayesACT agent will view that partner
through a more negative EPA. However, this process of
change is slow by default. By increasing the value of the
corresponding tuning parameter (which was held at its default
value for these experiments), larger changes in identity may
be allowed after every round, allowing for sooner retributive
action. Such an outcome could help these agents to better
conform to both the conditionality aspect of MCC and the
overall drop in cooperation rate over time observed in human
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 50.49 49.12 28.77 < 0.001
BACTD1 46.40 45.90 3.88 0.049
BACTD10 37.36 38.96 35.79 < 0.001
BACTS0 69.49 69.33 0.25 0.62
BACTS1 63.35 62.29 14.71 < 0.001
BACTS10 49.55 48.22 28.85 < 0.001
IM0 91.01 16.70 8.15×104 < 0.001
IM10 94.57 18.88 8.08×104 < 0.001
IM20 93.07 15.73 1.06×105 < 0.001
IM30 88.39 17.87 9.14×104 < 0.001
IM40 81.65 9.99 9.83×104 < 0.001
IM50 72.69 8.15 5.76×104 < 0.001
IM60 67.73 4.21 2.88×104 < 0.001
IM70 68.14 4.44 3.11×104 < 0.001
IM80 69.59 4.47 3.71×104 < 0.001
IM90 75.84 8.38 5.79×104 < 0.001
IM100 77.40 17.68 6.22×104 < 0.001
Table 8: A comparison of cooperation rates after being
surrounded by a majority of either cooperators or defectors on
the last turn. Shaded rows indicate that cooperation is higher
near other cooperators than near defectors (i.e. conditionality
is observed) and that the difference is statistically significant
(p < 0.05). This table presents results for network ER5 and
Reward M3.
players. Further, BayesACT agents can hold a separate
model for each opponent, leading to greater differentiation
in behaviour between neighbours.
While the imitation-based agents appear to come up short
in all requirements but one, it must be noted here that due to
the computational cost of BayesACT, we were not able to test
the full space of reward as completely as Vilone et al. [41].
It is therefore possible that an ideal setting for the imitator
agents was missed amidst that continuous space.
Looking to future work, we are looking to make
comparisons with additional agent models, though this is
complicated somewhat by the ill-adaptation of many agents to
a networked setting. For example, while a network composed
of simple strategies that perform well in a 1-on-1 setting like
tit-for-tat or win-stay-lose-shift proceed very rapidly towards
either full cooperation or full defection, it is possible that
incorporating random elements could produce more human-
like behaviour. Similarly, a version of Fehr and Schmidt’s
inequity aversion model [5], which creates agents that seek
to punish unjust success, modified for use on a network is of
interest.
Additionally, we are interested in applying BayesACT to
other types of networks. In particular, scale-free networks,
which were examined by Vilone et al. [41], are highly non-
uniform, unlike their grid and ER counterparts, and more
closely resemble human social networks [21]. However,
given that Grujic´ et al. [11] did not have data from
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.77 28.55 31.57 28.88 5.24
BACTD1 5.92 33.08 32.34 25.56 3.11
BACTD10 6.27 43.99 28.43 20.06 1.24
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 33.25 66.75 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.00 72.46 27.54 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 0.47 99.32 0.21 0.00
IM0 11.42 7.22 4.35 60.89 16.12
IM10 3.55 2.57 5.83 80.74 7.31
IM20 4.76 6.48 13.73 71.21 3.82
IM30 4.32 10.33 25.65 58.28 1.42
IM40 9.35 39.91 33.58 16.69 0.47
IM50 3.91 70.00 25.53 0.38 0.18
IM60 8.91 87.40 3.46 0.00 0.24
IM70 3.34 95.21 1.18 0.00 0.27
IM80 2.69 93.91 3.20 0.00 0.21
IM90 0.92 84.44 9.64 4.79 0.21
IM100 0.24 38.67 52.25 8.73 0.12
Table 9: A comparison of agent stratification according to the
5 groups of Grujic´ et al. [10]. Shaded rows indicate adherence
to Equation 2. This table presents results for network ER5
and Reward M3.
human studies on scale-free networks when making their
observations, it is not clear that invariance ought to continue
in that domain.
It would also be interesting to adjust the clustering of
agents within a network. Currently, BayesACT agents are
given random initial EPA distributions, creating a continuum
of “good” to “bad” identities. However, these agents are
mixed homogeneously throughout the network. If clusters
of nodes were assigned similar identities, it could produce
persistent microcosms within a wider network, much as
envisioned by Hamilton and Axelrod [13].
Removing the Broadcast restriction opens up further
opportunities for future work. If agents do not act
simultaneously, then there is freedom in selecting the
ordering of these actions. A simple solution would be to
rotate the agents such that each gets a turn, but this is not
the only option. Recalling Heise’s jury model [18], we could
allow the agent with the highest personal tension (i.e. the
squared difference between that agent’s fundamental self-
sentiment, and the transient self-sentiment resulting from the
last interaction in which it participated) to act next. This
could lead to further epxerimentation on the fragmentation
and segregation of agents in a networked environment.
Finally, we introduce the possibility of applying BayesACT
to networks in the wild. Though such networks do not
generally explicitly involve the Prisoner’s Dilemma, they
may contain features that can be cast as normal-form games.
When a FaceBook user ignores a friend request, or a GitHub
user denies a pull request, there is an implicit defection-like
interaction with another agent somewhere in the world. If one
supposes that such scenarios come with even a portion of the
emotional baggage of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, then BayesACT
may be able to help explain them.
Understanding the social and emotional forces behind
interactions between biological and technological agents
is increasingly important in the emerging socio-technical
society. Prior research suggests that people care at least as
much about maintaining social relationships as they do about
striving to maximize personal gains in their transactions with
others [1, 4, 6]. This makes intuitive sense, since maximizing
one’s gains depends on sustaining valuable relationships
over time. This paper has investigated a promising
social-psychological model of affective relationships in a
constrained and artificial simulation of a social dilemma in an
attempt to move towards more affectively and socially aligned
technological agents that will facilitate these relationships
between biological and technological agents.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that, compared to imitation-based agents,
agents based on the social-psychological affect control theory
(BayesACT agents) display as emergent properties more
of the human qualities identified by Grujic´ et al. [11]
in the Iterated Networked Prisoner’s Dilemma (INPD). In
particular, we show how the observed human behaviours of
network structure invariance, anti-correlation of cooperation
and reward, player type stratification, and (to a certain extent)
moody conditional cooperation, are all emergent properties of
these agents. We therefore believe that this work brings us a
step closer to reproducing human behaviour in the INPD, and
may find application both in domains that require human-like
behaviour, and those that wish to probe human reasoning.
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